

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 00023 01 OF 03 032225Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----032252Z 060371 /64

P R 032000Z JAN 77

FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY QUITO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BRASILIA 0023

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHLAUDEMANN FROM CRIMMINS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, EC, CI, PE, BL, VE

SUBJECT: PERU-CHILE-ECUADOR-BOLIVIA

REF: (A) STATE 310852; (B) BRASILIA 10514, (C) BRASILIA 10578

1. IT IS WITH DIFFIDENCE THAT I OFFER THE FOLLOWING IDEAS
CONCERNING THE HANDLING OF THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS
SITUATION ON THE WEST COAST. MY RESERVE ARISES IN PART
FROM MY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE NATURE OF OUR CONTINGENCY
PLANNING AND SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE CONSTRAINTS ON OUR
ACTIONS IDENTIFIED IN THEM.

2. BEFORE GETTING INTO MY OWN THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT WE MIGHT
DO, I WANT TO SET FORTH SOME CONSIDERATIONS THAT HAVE
SHAPED MY APPROACH:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 00023 01 OF 03 032225Z

A. CURRENT REPORTING FROM THE AREA SUGGESTS
THAT THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY (30 PERCENT? 20 PERCENT?)
THAT, WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO THREE YEARS, THE FORCES OF
IRREDENTISM AND REVANCHISME MAY PRODUCE ARMED CONFLICT
AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF THE WEST COAST. FURTHER, THE
CURRENT AND IMMEDIATELY FORESEEABLE SITUATION IS SUFFI-
CIENTLY FRAGILE AS TO CONSTITUTE A RISK OF AN UNPLANNED

AND UNINTENDED OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

B. THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY A WAR AMONG THE NATIONS DIRECTLY CONCERNED (THE "CONTENDING STATES"), WHETHER IT WERE THE RESULT OF A DELIBERATE DECISION ON THE PART OF ONE OF THE GOVERNMENTS OR OF AN ACCIDENT. THE THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IS MAGNIFIED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT OR INDIRECT SOVIET OR CUBAN INVOLVEMENT ON THE SIDE OF PERU.

C. THE MAJOR COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AMERICA NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED ("THIRD-PARTY STATES") ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE A GENERAL INTEREST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN THE AREA AND IN THE PACIFIC RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES THAT HAVE GIVEN RISE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED CONFLICT. THIS GENERAL INTEREST IS BELIEVED TO PREVAIL IN SPITE OF CONFLICTING AMBITIONS, RIVALRIES AND DISPUTES FOR LEADERSHIP AMONG THE "THIRD-PARTY STATES", AS WELL AS THEIR DIFFERING SYMPATHIES TOWARD INDIVIDUAL "CONTENDING STATES".

D. IN THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT CUBAN OR SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT (SEE E. BELOW), THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT AND CANNOT ACT UNILATERALLY TO PREVENT OR RESOLVE HOSTILITIES. IT IS MOST DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE A CREDIBLE U.S. UNILATERAL WARNING OF MAJOR UNILATERAL SANCTIONS (E.G., AN ECONOMIC OR FINANCIAL BOYCOTT BY THE U.S.) IN A PRE-HOSTILITIES PHASE OR, IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, A UNILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION OF ANY KIND BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH CHILE, PERU, BOLIVIA
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 00023 01 OF 03 032225Z

OR ECUADOR, THAT IS, WITH THE NATURE OF THE REGIMES OR WITH THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION. IT CONCERNS, RATHER, THE TOTALLY ANACHRONISTIC NATURE OF SUCH MAJOR UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF (1) THE COUNTRIES THAT WOULD BE THE OBJECTS OF THAT UNILATERAL ACTION, (2) THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, AND (3) U.S. OPINION. THIS LAST FACTOR IS NOT A QUESTION OF "LOSS OF WILL" OR "LACK OF GUTS" OR "ABANDONMENT OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES" -- NONE OF THAT NONSENSE. IT IS, AT BOTTOM, A RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT, IF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACT -- AND UNILATERAL MEASURES BY US PRESUPPOSE THAT SITUATION -- IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE EXERCISE OF A PRESUMED AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE BY OURSELVES. SHOULD THE "THIRD-PARTY" SOUTH AMERICANS FAIL TO ASSUME A ROLE, SHOULD THEY WHO HAVE THE BIGGEST STAKE IN PREVENTING, CONTAINING AND RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHIN THE SYSTEM LOOK THE OTHER WAY -- AND I CONSIDER SUCH A SCENARIO ENTIRELY UNREALISTIC, BE IT NOTED -- WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONVINCE OUR OPINION OF THE LEGITIMACY

OF OUR ACTING ALONE.

E. THIS FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATION WOULD NOT EXTEND TO A CONTINGENCY INVOLVING DIRECT CUBAN OR SOVIET MILITARY PARTICIPATION COUPLED WITH PASSIVITY ON THE PART OF SOUTH AMERICAN STATES TO SUCH PARTICIPATION. THIS LATTER ELEMENT OF THE COMBINATION IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY TO BE PRESENT, IF THE VAUNTED ANTI-COMMUNISM OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL (LEAVING ASIDE COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA) HAS ANY OPERATIONAL MEANING AT ALL. IF, HOWEVER, BY SOME HIGHLY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE, THE SOUTH AMERICAN "THIRD PARTIES" WERE DEMONSTRABLY TO COP OUT IN THE FACE OF CUBAN OR SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION, THEN UNILATERAL ACTION BY US WOULD BECOME FEASIBLE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 00023 02 OF 03 032223Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----032315Z 060364 /64

P R 032000Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY QUITO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BRASILIA 0023

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHLAUDEMANN FROM CRIMMINS

AS WELL AS ESSENTIAL.

F. US PARTICIPATION IN A MULTILATERAL PROCESS WHETHER AT EVERY STEP IN A PRE-HOSTILITIES PHASE OR DURING A HOSTILITIES PHASE, WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, FEASIBLE AND ESSENTIAL, WITH THE QUALIFICATION THAT US MEMBERSHIP IN ANY EVENT PEACE-KEEPING OR PEACE MAKING FORCE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE REQUIRED OR DESIREABLE.

G. MOST, IF NOT ALL, THE SOUTH AMERICAN "THIRD PARTY" STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE PART IN A MULTI-

LATERAL PEACE KEEPING AND PEACE MAKING EFFORT. THEIR INDIVIDUAL AMBITIONS AND SUSPICIONS OF ONE ANOTHER WOULD COMPLICATE BUT NOT ANNUL THE COMMON ENDEAVOR.

H. THE OAS AS AN INSTITUTION AND THE VARIOUS PEACE KEEPING INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING THE RIO TREATY, WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOKED EVENTUALLY. A MULTILATERAL EFFORT OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM WOULD HAVE VALIDITY AND EFFECTIVENESS UP TO A POINT, BUT IT SHOULD ULTIMATELY GIVE WAY TO THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 00023 02 OF 03 032223Z

OAS AND THE COLLECTIVE PEACE KEEPING AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO SEE IT AND THEM DESTROYED. (AS YOU KNOW, I AM HARDLY A FAN OF THE OAS IN ITS ALLEGED DEVELOPMENT ROLE, BUT THIS LACK OF FAITH AND OF ENTHUSIASM DOES NOT EXTEND TO ITS PEACE KEEPING POTENTIAL). THERE IS NO REASON FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AND NO COMPELLING JUSTIFICATION ON THE PART OF THE CONTENDING STATES FOR GOING TO THE UN RATHER THAN THE OAS. OTHERS, NOTABLY THE USSR AND CUBA, WOULD PROBABLY TRY TO SEIZE THE UNSC OF THE PROBLEM, BUT IT IS ASSUMED THAT THIS ATTEMPT WOULD BE RESISTED.

I. IN THE PERU-CHILE-BOLIVIA-ECUADOR COMPLEX THERE IS A PROGRESSION OF PROBLEMS TO DEAL WITH: FLURRIES OF ACUTE TENSION AMONG THE "CONTENDING COUNTRIES" THAT HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IMMEDIATELY THE DANGER, ESPECIALLY IN PERIODS OF HIGH TENSION, OF REAL FIGHTING BROUGHT ABOUT BY RASH ACTS, MISINTERPRETATIONS -- TRIGGER-HAPPINESS IN

GENERAL; THE IMBALANCE IN MILITARY CAPABILITY BETWEEN PERU AND ITS NEIGHBORS; THE PERSISTENT, IRRATIONAL YET REAL BOLIVIAN, ECUADORAN AND PERUVIAN IRREDENTISM AND RECANCHISMO THAT UNDERLIE EVERYTHING.

J. THE PRIMARY TASK IS TO CONTAIN AND, IF POSSIBLE REDUCE THE ACUTE MANIFESTATIONS IN ORDER TO PERMIT AN UNPRESSURED AND DISPASSIONATE CONSIDERATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CHRONIC PROBLEMS.

E. IF THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE PRESENT AND VALID -- AND I WOULD WELCOME YOUR AND MY COLLEAGUES' FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT -- I JUDGE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE FIRST TRY TO ORGANIZE A MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN WHICH THE FOLLOWING "THIRD PARTY" COUNTRIES WOULD PARTICIPATE THE US, BRAZIL, VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA AND ARGENTINA. (CONCERNING ARGENTINA, I WOULD HAVE BEEN SURPRISED TO SEE THAT BUENOS AIRES WAS NOT AN ADDRESSEE OF THE RECENT MESSAGE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT FOR MANY REASONS, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 00023 02 OF 03 032223Z

TO HAVE ARGENTIAN INVOLCMENT, AND I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHETHER THERE ARE SPECIAL REASONS FOR ITS NOT BEING INCLUDED.) AGAINST EVENTUAL RESORT TO THE OAS, A CASE COULD BE MADE FOR THE POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION OF MEXICO, PERHAPS IN AN INDIRECT FORM SUCH AS PERIODIC BRIEFINGS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FIVE. THIS KIND OF "ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP" COULD BE EXPANDED AS REQUIRED, WITH THE LIKELIHOOD OF RECOURSE TO THE OAS BEING THE TEST.

4. THE MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WOULD BE INTENDED TO SERVE SEVERAL PURPOSES. IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND IN THE SIMPLEST FORM, IT WOULD BE A DEVICE FOR SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEVELOPING SITUATION AMONG THE "CONTENDING COUNTRIES", PARTICULARLY IN TIMES OF RISING TENSION. IT WOULD SERVE TO TRIGGER RESTRAINING COLLECTIVE OR CONCERTED REPRESENTATIONS BY THE FIVE IN MOMENTS OF ACUTE UNEASINESS. AT SUCH TIMES, IT WOULD ALSO BE THE MEANS OF INDUCING THE CONTENDING PARTIES TO ACCEPT INSPECTIONS OF MILITARY DISPOSITION ALONG BORDERS AND TO BE A CLEARINGHOUSE FOR INFORMATION ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATIONS. BEYOND THESE "FIRE-BRIGADE"-TYPE FUNCTIONS THAT WOULD, I BELIEVE, BE REASONABLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL FIVE PARTICIPANTS, THE PROCESS COULD BECOME A GOOD-OFFICES KIND OF FORUM FOR DEVELOPING APPROACHES TO THE INTERMEDIATE PROBLEM OF PERUVIAN ARMS SUPERIORITY WITHIN THE FRAME OF ARMS LIMITATIONS OR REDUCTIONS AND THE CHRONIC PROBLEMS OF THE BOLIVIAN OUTLET, ECUADOR'S IRREDENTISM, AND PERU'S DESIRE FOR REVENGE. OF COURSE, I DO NOT IN ANY WAY UNDERESTIMATE THE APPARENT INTRACTABILITY OF THE DEEPLY ROOTED AND HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ROOT-CAUSES OF CONFLICT. A FINAL PURPOSE OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WOULD BE TO HAVE CREATED A "LEAD GROUP" OF STATES TO ACT WITHIN THE OAS IN THE EVENT THAT WORSE COMES TO WORST AND ARMED CONFLICT WAS SERIOUSLY THREATENED OR HAD ACTUALLY OCCURRED.

5. THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP THAT WOULD EMERGE IN THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRASIL 00023 02 OF 03 032223Z

PROCESS WOULD BE INFORMAL AND AD HOC IN THE SENSE THAT IT

WOULD NOT BE A COMMITTEE OF THE OAS COUNCIL NOR HAVE ANY DIRECT CONNECTION WITH OAS. ALTHOUGH CONSTANT PUBLICITY

NOTE BY 30CT: #TEXT AS RECEIVED.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 00023 03 OF 03 032222Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----032325Z 060359 /64

P R 032000Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY QUITO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BRASILIA 0023

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHLAUDEMANN FROM CRIMMINS

SHOULD BE AVOIDED, THE EXISTENCE OF THE GROUP AND ITS
GENERAL PURPOSES OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT BE KEPT SECRET, NOR
SHOULD THEY BE. KNOWLEDGE BY CHILE, BOLIVIA, PERU AND
ECUADOR WOULD BE SALUTARY. SIMILARLY, THE OAS WOULD BE
NOTIFIED INFORMALLY.

6. THE CONDUCT OF THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE
FLEXIBLE. AT FIRST, AND IN ALL TIMES OF CRISIS, IT WOULD
BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH EMBASSIES AND FOREIGN MINISTRIES.
AS THE PROCESS MATURED AND THE ADDRESS TO THE UNDERLYING
ISSUES WAS UNDERTAKEN (AND I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT
THERE WOULD BE AN APPRECIABLE TIME INTERVAL HERE, SINCE
OPTIMALLY THE TWO BASIC FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN
SIMULTANEOUSLY), IT WOULD PROBABLY BE ADVISABLE TO HAVE
THE FIVE GOVERNMENTS DESIGNATE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO
CONSIDER THE BED ROCK PROBLEMS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 00023 03 OF 03 032222Z

7. I HAVE TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS PROCESS AND THE
GROUP OF COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN IT ARE NOT INTENDED TO
FREEZE OUR OR PREEMPT THE OAS. THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER IN

THE PROCESS THAT WOULD INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THEOAS AND THE VARIOUS LEGAL TEXTS OF THE SYSTEM. A PRIME ADVANTAGE OF AN INFORMAL, AD HOC PROCEDURE LIKE THIS-- AND, OF COURSE, THERE CAN BE ANUMBER OF VARIATIONS OF IT-- IS THAT IT WOULD AVOID THE DRAMATIC, EVEN ALARMING AND ALWAYS HIGHLY VISIBLE INVOLVEMENTOF THE OAS BEFORE IT HAD BECOME NECESSARY OR EVEN, IN A JURIDICAL SENSE, POSSIBLE. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL, I REPEAT, TO INVOKE THE OAS IF THE EFFORTS OF THE FIVE WERE TO FAIL AND HOSTILITIES WERE, OR APPEAR ALMOST CERTAIN , TO BREAK OUT. AT THAT POINT, I WOULD HOPE THAT THE FIVE WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN THE OAS TO GET SWIFT ACTION.

8. A FINAL WORD ABOUT THE CHANCES OF BRAZIL'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROCESS. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT BUT THAT BRAZIL HAS AMBITIONS TO EXERT AN EXPANDED INFULENCE ON THE WEST COAST, IF ONLY IN TERMS OF ITS ECONOMIC PENETRATION. IT SEEKS TO PURSUE THESEAMBITIONS WITH AS MUCH FREEDOM OF ACTION AND A LITTLE "INTERFERENCE" FROM US AS POSSIBLE. IN THE ABSENCE OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, HOWEVER, I ACCEPT SILVEIAR'S REPEATED STATEMENTS TO ME THAT IT HAS PLAYED AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A MODERATING ROLE (AND HE WOULD ARGUE THAT THE "TILT" TOWARD CHILE EXPRESSED IN SIGNIFICANT ARMS TRANSFER IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT ROLE SINCE IT CONTRIBUTES TO REDRESSING A DANGEROUS IMBALANCE); THAT IT HAS INFORMED ALL PARTIES OF ITS NEUTRALITY WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPETING CLAIMS; AND THAT IT HAS EXPLAINED THAT NEUTRALITY AS, IN EFFECT, A PRE-CONDITION TO ANY EVENTUAL MEDIATION BY BRAZIL. ALTHOUGH SILVEIRA IS NOT THE MOST STRAIGHTFORWARD INTERLOCUTOR I HAVE EVER DEALT WITH AND ALTHOUGH I JUDGE -- INSTINCTIVELY, I ADMIT -- THAT, FOR HIM, THE PROSPECT OF BRAZLL 'S SINGLEHANDEDLY MEDIATING AND PRODUCING A SOLUTION ON THE WEST COAST -- IN WHICH, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 00023 03 OF 03 032222Z

NATURALLY, BRAZILIAN ASPERATIONS WOULD BE CONCOMITANTLY ADVANCED -- IS NOT ENTIRELY A WALTER MITTY-LIKE DAYDREAM. IN THIS CONTEXT, I WOULD EXPECT THE CLASSICAL WARINESS AND ADVANTAGE-SEEKING TOWARD ARGENTINA TO PRODUCE SOME AUTOMATIC BUT NOT INSUPERABLE RESERVE TOWARD THE LATTER'S INCLUSION IN ANY INFORMAL CONSUTATIVE GROUP SUCH AS THE ONE I HAVE OUTLINED. IN THE NET, I BELIEVE THATBRAZIL COULD PROBABLY BE INDUCED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS, WHOSE PURPOSES ARE DISINTERESTED AND MOTHERHOOD-LIKE AND ARE, AFTER ALL, CONSONAT WITH BRAZIL'S TRADITIONS AND WITH SILVEIRA'S OWN PROFESSIONS OF PURPOSE.

9. WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSTRATIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THAT BRAZIL COULD REPRESENT WITHIN THE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM. GENERALLY, THERE MIGHT BE A TENDENCY TOWARD A "LONE-

WOLF" OR EVEN "DOG-IN-THE-MANGER" STANCE. AND ON SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES THAT MIGHT BE ADDRESSED, BRAZIL WOULD BE A PROBLEM, ARMS REDUCTION OR LIMITATIONS CERTAINLY BEING ONE OF THEM. NONETHELESS, BRAZIL IS INDISPENSABLE TO ANY UNDERTAKING OF THIS KIND, AND, AS I SAY, I CALCULATE THAT THE ODDS ARE MODESTLY IN FAVOR OF ITS GOING ALONG.

10. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IF YOU CONSIDER THAT THE IDEA SKETCHED OUT ABOVE HAS AMERIT, IT MIGHT BE ADVISEABLE TO SOUND OUT VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA FIRST, ALWAYS PROVIDED SUCH AN APPROACH CAN BE KEPT SECRET. IF BRAZIL WERE TO BE FACED BY AGREEMENT AMONG THREE OF THE POTENTIAL FIVE PARTICIPANTS (AND I WOULD GUESS, PERHAPS WRONGLY, THAT ARGENTINA WOULD BE INTERESTED IN JOINING), ITS POSSIBLE RESERVATIONS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE WEAKENED. IN THIS SAME LINE, I CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER THAN COLOMBIA RATHER THAN THE US MAKE THE PITCH TO BRAZIL, IF THE SUGGESTION GETS THAT FAR. I SAY COLOMBIA INSTEAD OF VENEZUELA BECAUSE THE FORMER DOES NOT EVOKE THE INSTINCTIVE (THOUGH STOUTLY DENIED) BRAZILIAN REACTIONS OF COMPETITIONS THAT THE LATTER DOES. IN THE SAME VEIN, COLOMBIA HAS MORE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRASIL 00023 03 OF 03 032222Z

DIRECT STAKE GEOGRAPHICALLY THAN DOES VENEZUELA. ANOTHER FACTOR OPERATING AGAINST THE GOV FROM THE GOB'S PERSPECTIVE WOULD BE CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ PARTIALITY TOWARD PERU (OR AGAINST CHILE) THAT I READ ABOUT.

11. I LEAVE TO YOU THE QUESTION OF REPEATING THIS TELEGRAM TO BUENOS AIRES.
CRIMMINS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TROOP DEPLOYMENT, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, BORDER INCIDENTS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 03-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BRASIL00023
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770002-0471
Format: TEL
From: BRASILIA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770186/aaaacxcy.tel
Line Count: 421
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 8ce5e4dd-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 77 STATE 310852, 77 BRASILIA 10514, 77 BRASILIA 10578
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3675009
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PERU-CHILE-ECUADOR-BOLIVIA
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, EC, CI, PE, BL
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8ce5e4dd-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009